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Individualization Claims in Forensic 
Science: Still Unwarranted 
Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a 2008 paper published in the Vanderbilt Law Review 
entitled The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence,1 we argued that no scientific basis exists for the 
proposition that forensic scientists can “individualize” an 
unknown marking (such as a fingerprint, tire track, or 
handwriting sample) to a particular person or object to the 
exclusion of all others in the world.  
In that article we made the following claims:  
(1) the data necessary to achieve individualization have never been 
collected for any of the forensic science fields which aspire to 
individualize the source of crime scene evidence to its sole possible 
contributor; 
(2) the best available—and perhaps the only scientifically 
defensible—approach to forensic identification is the use of random 
match probability estimates (which are not yet employed by any of 
the traditional forensic identification sciences);  
(3) the argument that all objects are discernibly unique stands on 
little more than an oft-repeated maxim of forensic science legend and 
the illusory intuition that small frequencies imply uniqueness; 
(4) probability estimates (by definition) cannot lead to uniqueness or 
individualization;  
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O’Connor College of Law and Department of Psychology, Arizona State University, 
Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. 1100 S. McAllister Avenue. P.O. Box 877906. 
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906. michael.saks@asu.edu. The authors thank David Kaye for 
helpful comments. 
 1 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in 
Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008) [hereinafter Fallacy]. 
1188 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
(5) assertions of individualization generally exaggerate what is 
known or can be accomplished by forensic examiners.2  
The central point and purpose of our article was a 
practical concern: to argue that because no field of forensic 
identification has adequate grounds for making 
individualization claims, expert witnesses from those fields 
should not make such claims in their reports and testimony. 
We recommended that, in the short term, expert witnesses 
should (a) revise their testimonial language to more accurately 
characterize the meaning and value of their findings, and (b) 
report only those inferences that can be supported by what is 
actually known by their fields.3 We further suggested that, in 
the long term, empirical research should be undertaken to 
place the forensic disciplines on more solid scientific footing.4 
In this issue of the Brooklyn Law Review, we clarify, 
refine, and extend some of the ideas presented in Fallacy. Some 
of the refinements are prompted by Professor David Kaye’s 
paper, also in this issue of the Review,5 in which he takes issue 
with some of the arguments we made in Fallacy.  
  
 2 Moreover, we acknowledged that none of these essential insights is original 
to us. Others have discussed these problems for decades. We merely pulled these ideas 
together and discussed their implications. 
 3 Others have also called attention to the difficulty or impossibility of 
justifying claims of individualization. See Fallacy, supra note 1, at 214-16. Some 
thoughtful forensic scientists, such as Christophe Champod and his colleagues, have 
responded by attempting to develop probabilistic characterizations of fingerprint 
comparisons. See Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to 
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101 (2001); Cedric Neumann et 
al., Computation of Likelihood Ratios in Fingerprint Identification for Configurations of 
Any Number of Minutiae, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 54 (2007). Others have begun to tame the 
language used when reporting the meaning of a match. See, e.g., Firearms and 
Toolmark Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 34:1 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2008-2009). 
 4 Cf. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter 
NRC Report] (recognizing that none of the techniques that were the focus of our article 
have “been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific 
individual or source”); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of 
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 88 (2008) 
(arguing that the validity of the ACE-V fingerprint methodology has not been 
established through rigorous scientific experiments); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity 
of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 134 (2008) (“[T]he undeniable reality is that the community 
of forensic science professionals has not done nearly as much as it reasonably could 
have done to establish either the validity of its approach or the accuracy of its 
practitioners’ conclusions.”). 
 5 David H. Kaye, Probability, Individualization and Uniqueness in Forensic 
Science Evidence: Listening to the Academies, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1163 (2010).  
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At the same time, we think it is important to point out 
that Professor Kaye appears to agree with our key points. For 
example, Professor Kaye does not believe that uniqueness has 
been established in any of the traditional, low-tech forensic 
sciences such as handwriting, toolmark identification, 
shoeprints, or fingerprints.6 He does not believe that mere 
matching, without a showing of uniqueness, can establish 
individualization in the typical case.7 He does not argue that 
testimony asserting that an object has been linked to its source 
to the exclusion of all others in the world is a scientifically 
reliable statement in any traditional forensic science discipline 
given the current state of knowledge.8 He does not dispute our 
claim that probabilistic statements rather than absolutist 
statements would provide a more accurate characterization of 
forensic identification.9 He agrees that there is a disconnect 
between the strong claims made by forensic scientists and the 
available scientific data.10 And he agrees that reform is in 
order.11  
If we agree on so much,12 what is the disagreement? The 
overarching difference is that while our focus leans toward the 
practical implications for courts of the large problems (on 
which we agree), Professor Kaye’s focus is on more abstract and 
conceptual issues—worthy of serious discussion, but with fewer 
implications for forensic science or judicial practice. Among 
  
 6 See generally id. 
 7 Although the heading of Section II in Professor Kaye’s article reads 
“Individualization Without Uniqueness,” it appears that he does not believe that 
individualization can be achieved in the typical case without uniqueness. Elsewhere he 
has written: “A true match establishes that the two samples of DNA have the same 
profile. Unless the profile is unique, however, a true match does not conclusively prove 
that the two samples came from the same source.” DNA Typing, in 4 MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:1 (emphasis added) (App. 30B, defining “True 
Match”).  
 8 “[U]nder normal relevance rules, existing theory and data on the 
discernible uniqueness of trace evidence typically are too weak to justify admission of 
an opinion that a pattern is unique.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1182-83. 
 9 Some leading forensic scientists agree and have discussed this issue in 
detail. See Champod & Evett, supra note 3.  
 10 “[I]t is clear that if forensic scientists are to contribute fully to the just 
resolution of criminal cases, they need a less absolutist and more nuanced theory of 
identification than the traditional presumption of characteristics that are intuitively 
judged to be individualizing.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1185-86. 
 11 Id. at 1165 (“With the imprimatur of the National Academy of Sciences 
behind recommendations for major change, the need for forensic scientists or analysts 
to retreat from the most extreme claims finally should be apparent to the judiciary as 
well as the forensic science community.”). 
 12 “I agree with the critique of a great deal of forensic science testimony . . . .” 
Id. at 1166. 
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these are: definitions (when can something properly be termed 
“metaphysical”?), logic and linguistics (when may probabilistic 
knowledge be expressed as an absolute? what are the customs 
of scientific communities for taking such linguistic shortcuts?), 
locating exceptions to general rules (are there current 
situations where an individualization claim is justifiable?), and 
thoughts about when an inferential leap might be small enough 
to be justified.13 
  
 13 Another possible difference of note is that many of Kaye’s illustrations and 
arguments are based on DNA or other normal sciences. However, Fallacy was 
concerned almost exclusively with non-DNA forensic identification: handwriting, tire 
impressions, shoe prints, fingerprints, toolmarks, firearms, etc. DNA databases and 
methods are not illustrative of how other forensic identification sciences operate. See 
NRC Report, supra note 4, at 7 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, however, 
no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and 
with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a 
specific individual or source.”).  
  Unlike most traditional forensic sciences, DNA typing stands out as an 
area that has, from its beginnings, respected the underlying probabilistic nature of 
forensic identification. Consider the following from a memo in which a crime laboratory 
informed the prosecutors with whom it works that it will cease using potentially 
misleading terminology and will limit its characterizations of the meaning of 
indistinguishably similar DNA samples to the associated random match probabilities:  
The purpose of a forensic DNA analysis is to determine whether an 
individual can be excluded as the donor of a body fluid stain or other bodily 
substance, the source of which is in question. Once a comparison has been 
made between the DNA profile results from the questioned source and the 
DNA profile results from the reference person, one of two conclusions may be 
drawn: 
 the reference person is excluded as the donor of the questioned sample, or 
 the reference person cannot be excluded as the donor of the questioned 
sample 
This memo is to advise you that, effective November 1, 2003, the term 
‘match’ will no longer be used in the conclusions of CFS DNA reports, in an 
effort to more clearly link the conclusion drawn from an analysis to its 
purpose. For example, when a DNA profile from person ‘A’ matches a DNA 
profile from the crime scene, the conclusion in the CFS report will state that 
“person ‘A’ cannot be excluded as the contributor of the crime scene profile.” 
The significance of DNA findings will continue to be defined using a 
statistical calculation which addresses the probability of coincidentally 
selecting someone from the general population who also would not be 
excluded as the source of a DNA profile. 
. . . . 
The reported probability is the sole indicator of the significance of the finding 
that a person cannot be excluded as the source of a DNA profile. 
Memorandum from R.J. Prime, Director of The Centre of Forensic Sciences for the 
province of Ontario to Crown attorneys for the province (October 24, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the U.S. FBI does not follow this policy. Constance Holden, DNA 
Fingerprinting Comes of Age, 278 SCI. 1407, 1407 (1997) (reporting that the FBI 
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Before responding to some of the issues that Professor 
Kaye raises, we offer a more specific definition of the 
“individualization fallacy” that we introduced in Fallacy. We 
also briefly compare and contrast this fallacy with others that 
appear in the literature. 
II. DEFINING THE INDIVIDUALIZATION FALLACY 
In Fallacy we did not offer a precise definition of the 
individualization fallacy.14 We try to remedy that here. The 
individualization fallacy refers to the belief that a particular 
known person or object must be the source of questioned 
markings whenever (a) the examiner judges that a sufficient 
number of characteristics are observable in both the questioned 
markings and the known, and (b) the examiner cannot 
otherwise distinguish the questioned markings from the 
known. In other words, the fallacy arises when the forensic 
scientist rules out all other possible sources for the unknown 
marking, including the multitude he has not examined, once he 
has found a single object or person that matches the features of 
the unknown marking. The fallacy is deeply entrenched in 
forensic science practice, where most examiners say that their 
knowledge, training, and experience enable them to make the 
inferential leap from observed consistencies between markings 
and their putative source to a conclusion that no other object in 
the world could have produced those markings.15 
Several subtleties and distinctions are worth noting 
concerning the notion of uniqueness and fallacies that are 
related to the individualization fallacy. 
A. Uniqueness 
A belief that one can individualize or has individualized 
is often bolstered by the claim that no two objects in the 
  
encourages examiners to testify that two samples are a perfect match in cases where 
the random match probability is less than one in 260 billion). 
 14 Simon Cole, Against Uniqueness, Against Individualization, and how 
Wittgenstein Can Save Forensic Identification, LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK (forthcoming). 
 15 The International Association for Identification, which is one of the oldest 
and largest organizations of forensic science professionals, expects its members to offer 
fingerprint individualizations whenever matches are found. INT’L ASSOC. 
IDENTIFICATION, IAI POSITION CONCERNING LATENT FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION 1 
(2007), http://www.theiai.org/current_affairs/fingerprint_position_paper_20071129.pdf 
(“The IAI endorses the position that individuals may be identified as the source of a 
particular friction skin impression . . . .”). 
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universe leave indistinguishably similar markings. This claim 
of uniqueness (first expressed in the maxim that “nature never 
repeats”) is often proffered by forensic science practitioners, 
forensic science authorities, courts, and even federal agencies 
as “a defensible epistemological foundation for forensic 
testimonial claims of source attribution.”16 Assuming 
uniqueness to be true shortens the inferential chain from the 
perception that two markings are indistinguishably alike to the 
claim that whatever made one set of markings must have made 
the other.17  
But uniqueness is not essential to the practice of 
forensic individualization.18 Some examiners assert that they 
need deal only with the samples in front of them—the 
questioned and the known—and need give no thought at all to 
the frequency with which particular characteristics or sets of 
characteristics exist within the population from which those 
mark-producing objects came. Others claim to be able to 
discern “individualizing” characteristics from non-
individualizing markings, again without concerning themselves 
with population distributions of mark-producing objects. To be 
sure, there are certain circumstances where individualization 
could be achieved without having to make reference to the full 
population of such objects.19 But such circumstances are 
exceptional and do not explain why practitioners in virtually 
all areas of forensic identification—with the notable exception 
of DNA typing—behave as if the population of potential sources 
is of no consequence to the task of individualizing.20  
  
 16 Cole, supra note 14, at 12. 
 17 Compare the reasoning of examiners of fingerprints, firearms, 
handwriting, etc., to that of DNA examiners. The former go directly from the 
perception of great similarity to a conclusion of individualization. The latter must 
pause to calculate random match probabilities based on population data. 
 18 Cole, supra note 14, at 26 (“What distinguishes areas of friction ridge skin 
from these other objects is not ‘uniqueness’; it is their diagnosticity: our ability to 
assign traces of these objects to their correct source with a certain degree of specificity 
under certain parameters of detection and under certain rules governing such 
assignments.”). 
 19 See Kaye, supra note 5, at 1173-77. 
 20 This disregard of populations might be the result of the underlying 
assumption of uniqueness being so fully incorporated into forensic individualization 
practice that examiners have forgotten, or set aside, the argued basis for ignoring 
populations. 
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B. The Uniqueness Fallacy 
In Fallacy, we mentioned that the individualization 
fallacy is a cousin of David Balding’s uniqueness fallacy.21 The 
uniqueness fallacy is the mistaken belief that whenever the 
expected number of people or objects sharing a set of known 
characteristics is less than one, then one may infer that the 
known person or object is unique.22 Some proponents of 
individualization have made, and many courts have accepted, 
the argument that if the population is smaller than the inverse 
of the random match probability, then uniqueness is 
established.23 For example, if there are 6 billion people on earth, 
and an analyst reports that the relevant random match 
probability for, say, a DNA profile is 1 in 20 billion, then it is 
fallacious to conclude that the DNA profile in question must be 
unique. Fallacy cites Balding to explain why this is a fallacy, 
and presents other illustrative explanations.  
C. The Fingerprint Examiner’s Fallacy 
According to Simon Cole, the fingerprint examiner’s 
fallacy occurs when the (assumed) uniqueness of fingerprints is 
invoked to support the asserted accuracy with which 
fingerprint examiners can identify the source of latent prints.24 
As Cole points out, the relationship between fingerprint 
uniqueness and examiner accuracy is a tenuous one.25 Even if 
fingerprints are unique, it is fallacious to assume that 
uniqueness somehow confirms the accuracy of examiners’ 
identifications. By analogy, the (assumed) fact that every 
  
 21 Fallacy, supra note 1, at 205; see DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-
EVIDENCE: DNA PROFILES 148 (2005). 
 22 Fallacy, supra note 1, at 203. 
 23 Id. at 203-05. 
 24 Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility 
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1198 
(2004) (defining this fallacy: “The fingerprint examiner’s fallacy consists of reasoning 
that the uniqueness of the object of forensic study vouches for the validity of a forensic 
matching process.”). In the course of explicating the “fingerprint examiner’s fallacy,” 
Cole summarizes other elements that we develop in Fallacy and which others have 
raised for a long time. Indeed, Cole’s historical work shows that the problems 
associated with making justifiable individualization claims have been appreciated by 
forensic scientists and scholars for at least a century. Id. at 1199 (citing HENRY 
FAULDS, GUIDE TO FINGER-PRINT IDENTIFICATION 51 (1905)). However, this awareness 
has largely been hidden from the courts, which may help explain why the NRC Report, 
supra note 4, at 53, concludes that “the courts have been utterly ineffective” in filtering 
forensic identification evidence. 
 25 Cole, supra note 24, at 1198. 
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human face is distinguishable from every other human face 
does not assure that eyewitness identifications are always 
accurate. Cole argues that much more is involved in drawing 
conclusions and in evaluating the risk of error, and that claims 
of uniqueness do not get us very far in those regards.26 
In sum, several related forensic science fallacies have 
been identified, but they are distinct. The uniqueness fallacy 
concerns the faulty reasoning that match probabilities smaller 
than the reciprocal of the population of interest lead to 
inferences of uniqueness. The fingerprint examiner’s fallacy 
concerns the faulty reasoning that turns the alleged 
uniqueness of fingerprints into an argument for the accuracy of 
fingerprint identifications. The individualization fallacy, which 
was suggested in Fallacy, concerns the faulty reasoning that 
certain observations are sufficient to individualize, regardless 
of whether uniqueness is invoked in support. 
III. RESPONDING TO PROFESSOR KAYE 
Professor Kaye takes issue with what he refers to as our 
“radical skepticism of uniqueness,”27 though, as mentioned in 
the Introduction, he agrees with the gravamen of Fallacy.28 The 
disagreements that Professor Kaye has with Fallacy have more 
to do with theoretical issues about what might be possible in 
forensic science than with practical concerns about what has 
been achieved and how those achievements are reflected in 
courtroom practice. Three topics on which we do appear to 
disagree are metaphysics, uniqueness, and individualization. 
A. Metaphysics 
Professor Kaye questions our suggestion that forensic 
individualization rests more on metaphysical and rhetorical 
grounds than on scientific and empirical grounds. As we 
understand his argument, Professor Kaye’s position is that the 
individualization hypothesis is not metaphysical because 
“individuality . . . [concerns] measurable characteristics that 
  
 26 Id. at 1201-03. 
 27 We doubt that our position on uniqueness qualifies as “radical skepticism.” Our 
position is that it has not been proved and that it seems unlikely that so extreme a position 
as individualization-to-the-exclusion-of-all-others—a frequently-invoked foundation stone of 
forensic individualization—could be proved. Kaye, supra note 5, at 1166. 
 28 “Although I agree with the critique of a great deal of forensic science 
testimony . . . .” Id. 
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can exhibit unequivocal differences and similarities.”29 
Although we largely agree with the quoted statement,30 it 
reflects only part of the picture. The larger and more pragmatic 
part is that individualization claims come to court supported 
mainly by exaggerated rhetoric and reasoning that is grounded 
in little empirical data.31 Professor Kaye agrees that the 
rhetoric of forensic individualization far exceeds the science,32 
though he takes issue with our use of the word “metaphysical” 
to describe the foundations for the individualization claim.33 We 
maintain that our use of the term in this context is accurate 
and appropriate. 
In a concluding section in Fallacy titled “Unproved and 
Perhaps Unprovable,” we wrote: 
In sum, no sound and rigorous evidence supports the assumption of 
unique individualization. Moreover, the assumption is so heroic and 
the research required to test it seriously would be so massive that 
one must doubt whether it is possible to conduct an empirical study 
or set of studies that would provide solid support for the hypothesis.34 
Our claim, then, is not that there is a rule of logic or 
ontology that prevents individualization. Instead, we are 
concerned with the more practical issues of whether 
individualization has been proven, how amenable it is to 
testing, and whether the self-presentation of these fields in 
court accurately reflects the limitations of testing, proof, and 
case-specific conclusions. On all of these issues, we think 
forensic individualization science has fallen short despite being 
in the expert witness business for a century. Consequently, we 
think it is fair to characterize the individualization claim as 
predominantly rhetorical. As for our invocation of 
  
 29 Id. at 1167. 
 30 “Unequivocal” is too strong. Perceptual and judgmental disagreements will 
be common in the process of making such assessments. See, e.g., I.W. Evett & R.L. 
Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales, 
46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 49 (1996). 
 31 NRC Report, supra note 4, at 188-89 (“In most forensic science disciplines, 
no studies have been conducted of large populations to establish the uniqueness of 
marks or features”); id. at 184 (“[T]he concept of ‘uniquely associated with’ must be 
replaced with a probabilistic association . . . .”); see also Harry T. Edwards, Solving the 
Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS 5, 8-9 (2009) 
(referring to the “dearth of scientific research to establish limits of performance, to 
ascertain quantifiable measures of uncertainty, and to address the impact of the 
sources of variability and potential bias in fingerprint examinations and in other 
forensic disciplines that rely on subjective assessments of matching characteristics”). 
 32 See supra notes 8, 10-12 and accompanying text. 
 33 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1167. 
 34 Fallacy, supra note 1, at 213-14. 
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“metaphysical,” readers who consult a good dictionary are 
likely to find that there are several meanings of this word that 
fit well with the situation we have described. 
B. Uniqueness 
Professor Kaye seems to agree with our central point 
about uniqueness. That is, he seems to agree that data—either 
in principle or in practice—cannot establish the truth of a 
uniqueness point prediction.35 He says: “Uniqueness means that 
the proportion of objects with the given feature in the whole 
population of size N is exactly 1/N. Yet, no matter how close the 
sample proportion comes to 1/N, the next sample datum could 
establish that the population proportion is 2/N or more.”36 
However, Professor Kaye does not think that the fact that 
empirical sampling has not and cannot demonstrate 
uniqueness is the important point.37 Instead, he believes that 
  
 35 Professor Kaye objects to this characterization of his position. That is, 
whereas we say that he agrees with us that data cannot establish the truth of a 
uniqueness point prediction, he says that his position is that “data cannot establish to 
an absolute certainty the truth of any point estimate of any population parameter.” 
Email from David Kaye to Jay Koehler & Michael Saks (Feb. 21, 2010, 15:16) (on file 
with authors) (emphasis added). In this same correspondence, Professor Kaye also says 
that he believes that “one can ‘establish the truth’ of a proposition without being 100% 
certain that it is true.” Id. Apparently, then, our disagreement turns on what it means 
to “establish the truth” of a proposition. When we say “establish the truth” of a 
particular point prediction, we mean that all point predictions other than the target 
prediction have been ruled out by the data. We interpret Professor Kaye’s use of the 
phrase “establish the truth” to mean something substantially weaker, something more 
akin to a strong personal belief that has a solid foundation in data. Although language 
is often sufficiently imprecise that there is room for personal interpretation, we simply 
do not accept this weakened definitional form of “establish the truth.” Nor do we 
believe that this definition fits with a common understanding of the phrase. For 
example, we suspect that if an examiner claims that data have “established” that such-
and-such is true, jurors will not interpret this to mean merely that the examiner has a 
strong belief in the proposition and has some data to back up this belief. Instead, jurors 
are likely to equate the examiner’s establishment claim with the indefensible claim 
that the data have established the claim to a certainty. In other words, there is no 
practical difference between a claim that data have established the truth of a 
uniqueness point prediction, and a claim that data have established that truth to an 
absolute certainty. And this is why we say that, linguistic preferences aside, there is no 
meaningful difference between our position and Professor Kaye’s on the issue of 
whether data can truly establish uniqueness: we all agree that they cannot. 
 36 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1170-71. 
 37 Professor Kaye objects to this characterization of his position for reasons 
similar to those described supra note 35. He thinks that sampling “can demonstrate 
uniqueness (in principle, in some populations) especially when considered together 
with an understanding of the sources of randomness.” Email from David Kaye to Jay 
Koehler & Michael Saks (Feb. 21, 2010, 15:16) (on file with authors) (emphasis added). 
Once again, we confront a linguistic problem where we and Professor Kaye are not 
using common words and phrases (like “demonstrate uniqueness”) in the same way.  
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the focus should be on “whether criminalists are warranted in 
believing” that fingerprints are unique.38 
We agree that the uniqueness question must turn on the 
issue of what the science supports, but it is not clear that we 
and Professor Kaye draw the same inferences from that 
science. In our view, the existing and foreseeable scientific 
knowledge falls far short of providing criminalists with enough 
scientific support to claim that the objects that they study are 
either unique or discernibly unique. Certainly the uniqueness 
question cannot turn on the beliefs that forensic scientists have 
about this issue based on their training and experience. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, criminalists 
may have felt that they had good justification for believing 
many things that subsequent scientific study revealed to be 
untrue. For example, at one time criminalists believed that 
they were impervious to context effects, or that bullets with 
similar trace element profiles necessarily had been 
manufactured in the same lead melt. But subsequent scientific 
study indicated that those beliefs were either untrue39 or 
premature.40 People hold sincere but mistaken and unsupported 
beliefs all the time and, in many cases, the negative 
consequences are minimal. But when representatives of an 
assertedly scientific discipline allow assumption and good faith 
belief to substitute for good grounds41 and scientific knowledge,42 
the practical effects can hamper the advancement of the 
science as well as the search for justice in particular cases. 
When forensic scientists testify under oath that markings are 
unique, they rarely qualify that testimony by conceding that 
the claim reflects more of a personal belief than a scientific 
fact.43 The practical reality is that most forensic scientists 
  
 38 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1172. 
 39 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD 
EVIDENCE 96-99 (2005); Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts 
Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 77 (2006) 
(“[I]t is possible to alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by 
presenting it in a different context.”). 
 40 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (2008) (Daniel L. Cork et 
al. eds. 2008) (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and 
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”). 
 41 “Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., 
‘good grounds’ . . . .” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 42 “‘[S]cientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. 
Similarly, the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported 
speculation.” Id. 
 43 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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bolster the perceived probative value of their individualization 
testimony at trial by asserting that evidentiary markings are 
unique, and that forensic scientists can individualize by 
discerning that uniqueness.44 This is bad science, bad policy, 
and should not be welcome on grounds that the testifying 
expert is merely expressing a sincere belief. 
C. Individualization 
Professor Kaye takes exception to our skepticism about 
whether individualization claims can be proved. In Fallacy, we 
argued that individualization—the process of linking an 
unknown marking to a source, to the exclusion of all other 
possible sources45—is “unproved and perhaps unprovable.”46 
Professor Kaye disagrees. But much of significance can be said 
about our disagreement, starting with what he means by the 
term “individualization,” which departs from the conventional 
meaning in important ways.  
1. Definitions 
As we and forensic scientists themselves use the term, 
individualization refers to a finding that a particular print or 
marking was produced by a particular source, to the exclusion 
of all other possible sources on the planet. Importantly, 
individualization is not merely a conclusion that a particular 
source might be the source of a target marking, that many 
other possible sources can be ruled out as the source, or that 
there is only a slim chance that any source other than the 
named one would share the observed characteristics of the 
unknown marking. Individualization is a claim that all 
potential sources but one have been affirmatively ruled out as 
the person or object that produced the print or marking in 
  
 44 SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS (“SWGFAST”), 
2009 Standards for Minimum Qualifications and Training to Competency for Friction 
Ridge Examiner Trainees (fingerprint examiner training document stating that 
examiners must “[u]nderstand the basic foundations for friction ridge examination 
(persistence and uniqueness) as a means of identifying the source of an impression”); 
see also NRC Report, supra note 4, at 43 (forensic scientists “believe that unique 
markings are acquired by a source item in random fashion and that such uniqueness is 
faithfully transmitted from the source item to the evidence item being examined”). 
 45 See The General Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, 4 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19. 
 46 Fallacy, supra note 1, at 208. 
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question. That is the definition of individualization most widely 
understood within the forensic sciences.47  
In the conventional practice of fingerprint examiners, a 
different term, “identification,” is considered a proper way to 
express a conclusion of “individualization.”48 As Thornton and 
Peterson explain: 
[I]n everyday usage, the term identification often is used when the 
concept of individualization is intended. One may hear testimony of 
the sort, “I identified the latent fingerprint as having been made 
from the right ring finger of the defendant.” The intent of the 
witness here is to declare clearly that the latent fingerprint was that 
of the defendant, to the total exclusion of all other fingers of all of 
the other people in the world. The use of the term “identified” here is 
not the most precise usage of the word; the term “individualized” 
would be more felicitous. But use of the term “individualization” and 
various other forms of the word would only confuse matters. If, in 
response to the question, “Did you have occasion to identify the 
suspect’s fingerprint on the knife?” the witness were to answer, “No, 
I individualized it,” communication would be thwarted and the 
listener confused.49  
Although most examiners use the terms 
individualization and identification interchangeably—a 
practice that is sometimes promoted by forensic science 
working groups50—some fingerprint examiners have recently 
suggested a novel distinction between individualization and 
  
 47 “The individualisation of an impression is established by finding 
agreement of corresponding individual characteristics of such number and significance 
as to preclude the possibility (or probability) of their having occurred by mere 
coincidence, and establishing that there are no differences that cannot be accounted 
for.” FORENSIC HUMAN IDENTIFICATION: AN INTRODUCTION 74 (Tim Thompson & Sue 
M. Black eds., 2007) (quoting HAROLD TUTHILL, INDIVIDUALIZATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCEDURES IN CRIMINALISTICS (1994)); see also 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 
supra note 3, § 30:19; NRC Report, supra note 4, at 43-44; Keith Inman & Norah 
Rudin, The Origin of Evidence, in 126 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 11, 11-16 (2002). 
 48 See SWGFAST, Quality Assurance Guidelines for Latent Print Examiners 
(ver. 3.0, 2006) available at http://www.swgfast.org/Quality_Assurance_Guidelines_for_ 
Latent_Print_Examiners_3.0.pdf (referring to “individualization” throughout); 
Christophe Champod, The Inference of Identity of Source: Theory and Practice, Address 
at the First International Conference on Forensic Human Identification in The 
Millennium, at 1 (Oct. 1999), available at http://www.latent-prints.com/images/ 
The%20Inference%20and%20Identity%20of%20Source.pdf (“Among identification 
fields, the term identification generally denotes individualization”). However, 
identification is also used by forensic scientists to refer to the process of determining 
the category to which an object belongs. This is the nature of the answer to the 
question, “what chemical substance is this white powder?” See, e.g., 4 MODERN 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19; NRC Report, supra note 4, at 36; Inman & 
Rudin, supra note 47. 
 49 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 30:19. 
 50 See SWGFAST, supra note 48.  
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identification. This latest redefinition is significant for our 
purposes here because it may help explain how Professor Kaye 
arrives at his own definition of individualization. 
In a recent Minnesota case, two forensic scientists 
testified that individualization claims cannot be proven: “The 
only way you could prove that is to look at every single person 
on the planet. It’s not physically possible and even if you could 
do that, that doesn’t mean someone tomorrow won’t be born 
with the same friction ridge skin.”51 One of these examiners 
went on to draw a distinction between an individualization and 
an identification. According to this examiner, “identification” 
means that the examiner 
made a decision that the chance that someone else could have left 
[the print] is so remotely small, he’s willing to dismiss it and say yes, 
I believe that this latent print in my opinion was produced by that 
individual. He did not say that he’s excluded everyone else on the 
planet and he left a theoretical possibility that there might be 
someone else on the planet that could have produced a similar 
looking latent print. And he has no way of calculating what that 
probably is at this time.52  
One explanation for this novel attempt to distinguish 
between an individualization and an identification might be 
that it is an attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too. 
Examiners can, on the one hand, acknowledge the scientific 
impossibility of “individualizing” while at the same time 
preserve the ability to pinpoint a suspected source by asserting 
an “identification” and standing it on a more humble 
foundation of personal opinion.53  
Professor Kaye defines individualization much as 
examiner Langenburg seeks to define the weaker term 
identification: as “the conclusion that ‘this trace came from this 
  
 51 Transcript of Record at 148, State v. Hull, 2008 WL 4301902 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 28, 2008) (CR-07-2336) (cross-examination of Glenn Langenburg). A second 
forensic scientist testifying in this same hearing testified that, “the only way to really 
say an individualization could occur, is to actually do comparisons to all prints of 
everyone that has ever lived.” Id. at 48-49 (direct examination of Joshua Bergeron); see 
also Christophe Champod, Identification and Individualization 1 (Nov. 6, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (concluding that “individualization conclusions are out of 
reach and cannot be easily substantiated, either in the classic identification fields (such 
as fingerprint evidence) or in DNA profiling”). 
 52 Transcript of Record at 149, Hull, 2008 WL 4301902 (CR-07-2336). 
 53 Champod & Evett, supra note 3, at 103 (demonstrating that “the 
inferential process of identification . . . is essentially inductive and hence 
probabilistic”). 
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individual or this object.’”54 But individualizations are more 
than subjective source conclusions or a witness’s personal 
feelings or hunches. They are bold statements about the world 
that require proof that cannot now (and probably never will be) 
obtained. The definition that Professor Kaye relies on reduces 
individualization to a subjective belief that is bolstered by 
evidence that falls far short of sufficient proof for this extreme 
claim. The difference between individualization as it is 
commonly understood and the definition offered by Professor 
Kaye is the difference between claiming that Alberto is the 
tallest man in the world because his measured height is 
greater than every other person in the world, and claiming that 
Alberto is the tallest man in the world either because an 
insufficiently tested theory assumes he is or because we have 
not seen anyone taller among those we have looked at. 
2. Small Population Examples 
Professor Kaye posits that “there are circumstances in 
which an analyst reasonably can testify to having determined 
the source of an object.”55 He offers two such circumstances. In 
one, he describes an unusual situation where a fingerprint 
examiner likely would be justified in claiming that he 
individualized a latent print. The situation concerned a crime 
that was known with certainty to have occurred at sea and a 
latent print that was known with certainty to belong to one of a 
relatively small number of passengers, all of whom are 
available for testing. We agree that there are some 
circumstances in which the potential source population56 of a 
print or marking may be narrowed to a small, accessible set. 
Indeed, such examples are not unfamiliar in discussions of 
individualization.57 However, these examples provide more 
  
 54 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1166. 
 55 Id. 
 56 The potential source population is “the group of people who might 
reasonably be the source of the recovered trace evidence.” Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA 
Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising Answers, 76 JUDICATURE 222, 
227 (1993). 
 57 One of the authors has used it himself. See Michael J. Saks, Explaining the 
Tension Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME 
329, 342 n.1 (2008) (“There is at least one circumstance where certainty of 
individualization could be achieved: If the candidates for the perpetration of a crime 
could be narrowed to a finite group, and each member of the group had distinguishable 
markings (be they fingerprints or something else), and it was known that the 
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support for the argument that individualization claims are 
generally unwarranted than they do for the argument that 
individualization should be broadly encouraged. Small, closed 
population examples “work” only because one can compare 
target latent prints to every member of the potential source 
population. The presence of this unusual circumstance is what 
sets the stage for an individualization claim (provided, of 
course, that all but one print can be eliminated as potential 
sources of the target latent).  
But what about the more typical situation where the 
potential source population cannot be narrowed much beyond 
the general population or some other large population? In these 
cases, examiners are not able to eliminate every member of the 
potential source population, and therefore they are not about to 
identify a source using the logical rigor that arises in the small, 
closed population example. With this in mind, the relevance of 
the ship hypothetical that Professor Kaye offered is not to say 
“if individualization can be achieved in this context it can be 
achieved in others.” Instead, these types of hypotheticals 
remind us that the defensible approach of comparing a 
questioned print or marking to all prints or markings in the 
potential source population is often not possible. And when 
forensic examiners can do no better than sample from larger 
potential source populations and draw inferences from their 
findings, then they must forsake absolutes. In its place, 
forensic scientists should do what other scientists do: offer 
suitably cautious conclusions that make use of the tools of 
probability and statistics.58  
3. Small Random Match Probabilities and the 
Inferential Leap 
Professor Kaye argues that a second circumstance in 
which claims of unequivocal source and individualization 
claims are justified occurs when random match probabilities 
  
perpetrator left his markings on the body (or on whatever), then the person who 
matched the crime scene markings would have to be the perpetrator.”). 
 58 See Champod & Evett, supra note 3. We should also note that a new breed 
of sophisticated forensic scientists working in the fingerprint area is developing models 
and procedures aimed at providing transparent, empirically based, probabilistic 
conclusions to replace individualization claims. Glenn Langenburg & Cedric Neumann, 
Moving Towards Using Statistics for Fingerprint Evidence in the Courtroom, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, Seattle, WA, 
February 26, 2010. 
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are very small.59 In a nutshell, his argument is that object 
uniqueness and individualization are, for all intents and 
purposes, proved even when there remains a chance that some 
objects are not unique or that an individualized marking was 
actually produced by some unexamined object. Science, he says, 
does not require absolute certainty.60 Instead, we draw 
reasonable inferences from the data we have and proceed as if 
that inference were absolutely true.  
Professor Kaye offers, as an example, the treatment of 
Ohm’s law: “Ohm’s law might not be exactly right, or it might 
break down tomorrow, but electrical engineers can safely 
assume that it is absolutely true.”61 The implication is that even 
if forensic examiners can’t be 100% sure of their ability to 
individualize, they are safe in proceeding on the assumption 
that their individualization conclusions are absolutely true.  
An easy response is that Ohm’s law not only “might not 
be exactly right,” but it actually is demonstrably wrong under 
so many conditions that electrical engineers are not safe to 
assume that it is “absolutely true.”62 The implication of the 
conditional nature of Ohm’s law for forensic science 
individualization claims is that it would not be safe for courts 
to simply regard individualization as absolutely true. But this 
is too easy. The example Professor Kaye chose was flawed, but 
we trust that there exist better illustrations of the point he 
wishes to make.  
Our response to those better examples would be that 
even the best of them is not an apt analogy to the problem that 
forensic individualization presents to courts. First, engineers 
  
 59 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1176 (“[A] well founded and extremely tiny random-
match probability indicates that, even if some other pairs of objects do match, the 
match at issue is not merely a coincidence; rather, it is a true association to a single 
source. In appropriate cases, therefore, it is ethical and scientifically sound for an 
expert witness to offer an opinion as to the source of the trace evidence.” (footnote 
omitted)). Arguably, that final inferential leap is for the factfinder to make—using 
knowledge supplied by the expert—not for the expert to make for the factfinder, with 
no basis greater than what the factfinder now has. See Wells, infra note 77 and 
accompanying text.  
 60 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1174. 
 61 Kaye, supra note 5, at 1168. 
 62 Ohm’s law—which states (in part) that the current between two points in a 
conductor is directly proportional to the potential difference (voltage) across the two 
points—“holds only approximately and under limited conditions and not for all 
materials.” SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ENCYCLOPEDIA 376 (1999). Although there are 
contexts within which electrical engineers may safely treat that the law as true, there 
are other contexts where such an assumption would spell disaster. Forensic 
individualization assumptions probably operate the same way, except that we know far 
less about the conditions under which they do and do not hold. 
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and scientists have more intimate knowledge of their theories 
and data, and appreciate their limitations. Lawyers, judges, 
and jurors are much less likely to understand the limitations of 
the claims being made for forensic individualization, and the 
limitations of its theory, its data, and its conclusions. Second, 
the central claim of forensic individualization science is 
qualitatively different from all or virtually all other sciences. 
Where other sciences cautiously test hypotheses about 
relationships among variables, the forensic individualization 
sciences simply offer error-bar-free point predictions without 
backing those predictions with anything that approaches 
scientific validation.63 At the risk of redundancy, it is important 
to be clear about what individualization is and is not. It is not 
simply a scientific classification claim in which the object in 
question is one of a small number of possible sources for the 
questioned marking. Nor is it a claim that the probability that 
another object is the source is low or even extremely low. It is a 
claim that the probability that an object other than the one 
identified by the examiner could be the source of the 
questioned marking is exactly zero.64 The examiner justifies his 
impossibility thesis by making an unwarranted inferential leap 
from the mere observation of similar markings or, at best, an 
impression or intuition of a low frequency of such markings.  
  
 63 Summarizing a central theme in the NRC Report, one of the co-chairmen of 
the report refers to the “paucity of scientific research to confirm the validity and 
reliability of forensic disciplines.” See Edwards, supra note 31, at 2. 
 64 The notion that forensic individualization claims are extreme and 
fundamentally unscientific is neither a radical idea nor one that is original with us. 
Consider, for example, the following passage from a 1998 book by the highly respected 
forensic statistician Ian Evett and equally respected biostatistician Bruce Weir about 
the meaning of a fingerprint “identification”: 
We should be in no doubt about the degree of certainty implicit in a 
fingerprint identification. The expert is, in effect, saying “I am certain that 
this latent mark and this control print were made by the same person and no 
amount of contrary evidence will shake my certainty”. Or, to look at this from 
a Bayesian perspective, no matter how small the prior odds are, the 
likelihood ratio is so large that the posterior odds approach infinity. Stoney 
sees that a fingerprint identification is based on a “leap of faith,” and he is 
quite correct to conclude that such a leap of faith has nothing to do with 
scientific principles. It is that leap of faith that characterizes the essence of a 
conclusion of identity of source and, as he points out, that is a fundamental 
difference between fingerprint evidence and DNA evidence. Stoney’s “leap of 
faith” is equivalent to attaining an infinite likelihood ratio; this kind of belief 
cannot derive from any scientific process. 
IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS 
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 240-41 (1998). Though Evett and Weir use the phrase 
“identification” rather than “individualization,” their perspective coincides perfectly 
with our own. 
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One must remain mindful of where these shortcuts—
these inferential leaps from probably to absolutely—typically 
occur. They do not take place primarily in classrooms, 
workplaces, or in conversations among mutually 
knowledgeable experts. They typically occur as expert 
testimony in courtrooms, where novice decisionmakers are 
charged with, among other things, weighing the value of that 
testimony. But the courtroom is a poor environment for 
elevating presumed probabilistic truths pertaining to forensic 
science evidence to scientific truths.  
4. Policy 
Even if forensic science individualization claims were 
supported by rigorous scientific testing, and even if Professor 
Kaye’s view that very low random match probabilities (if and 
when they were determined to exist in the various forensic 
sciences) were accepted as providing sufficient support for 
claims of individualization, good policy reasons counsel against 
permitting individualization testimony in criminal litigation. 
First, in light of the long history of untested techniques, 
insufficient research, testimonial exaggerations, and fabricated 
findings in the forensic sciences,65 we should be hesitant about 
further elevating and legitimating unproven forensic science 
claims. 
Second, given the adversarial nature of legal 
proceedings, the elevation of presumed truths or linguistic 
shortcuts66 to scientific ones unfairly privileges the offering 
party (which is usually the government).  
Third, a seemingly harmless inferential leap from a very 
low probability to zero probability in the context of a criminal 
trial might have unintended consequences. One consequence is 
the suppression of uncertainty.67 When forensic scientists offer 
  
 65 See generally NRC Report, supra note 4.  
 66 Professor Kaye writes that “scientists have indicated that opinions of 
general uniqueness or uniqueness of a particular DNA type within some smaller region 
are or will soon become scientifically acceptable.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1186 (footnotes 
omitted). If true, this phenomenon is being driven more by the exigencies of litigation 
than by the results of scientific research. As others have noted, this is less of a 
“scientific breakthrough,” as the idea was characterized when first announced, and 
more of a “semantic breakthrough.” William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, 
Psychological Aspects of Forensic Identification Evidence, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL 
TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 31, 45 (Mark Costanzo, Daniel Krauss & Kathy Pezdek 
eds., 2007).  
 67 Cole, supra note 14, at 30. 
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an individualization conclusion, they signal to a factfinder that 
there is little point in weighing any evidence that militates 
against the expert’s conclusion. This could lead to serious 
errors by the factfinder.  
The inordinate power of expert assertions is illustrated 
by a case in which a victim knew a suspect well and excluded 
him from a photo identification: she was sure he was not the 
man who raped her. Later, she was told that supposedly 
irrefutable scientific evidence pinpointed the man as her 
attacker. Induced to disbelieve her own personal knowledge, 
and given another opportunity to identify the suspect as being 
the rapist, she did so. At trial, the victim’s eyewitness 
identification was more dramatic and compelling than the 
“scientific” evidence, though it was a byproduct of the 
“scientific” evidence.68 The suspect, William O’Dell Harris, was 
convicted and sent to prison. Years later, it was learned that 
the “scientific” evidence had been fabricated.69 When the 
biological evidence was subjected to DNA testing, Harris was 
excluded as the rapist. After eight years in prison he was 
exonerated and released.70 If fabricated scientific evidence can 
cause a witness to disbelieve her own personal knowledge and 
accept a complete falsehood as true, surely factfinders are also 
susceptible to believing exaggerated testimony to the point of 
assuming that there is little uncertainty left to resolve in a 
case.  
Fourth, research suggests that statements made by 
experts are given considerable deference by jurors and their 
impact is unlikely to be undone either through cross-
examination or rebuttal witnesses.71  
Fifth, when experts exaggerate the state of their science 
and their exaggerations find acceptance in the courtroom, 
  
 68 See Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence 114-16 
(2000) (describing the case).  
 69 This was just one of myriad cases that the forensic scientist in the case, 
Fred Zain, was eventually found to have fabricated. Zain’s fabrications led the West 
Virginia Supreme Court to declare that, “as a matter of law, any testimonial or 
documentary evidence offered by Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should 
be deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible.” In re Investigation of the W. Va. 
State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 506 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the 
findings of the Report of a special inquiry ordered by the Court). 
 70 The Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
know/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). 
 71 Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 41 (1996); see also Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the 
Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 913 (2003). 
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researchers have less incentive for conducting the basic and 
applied research needed to put these assertions to the test.72 
Thus, research on the frequency with which various 
characteristics occur and on the best ways to convey forensic 
science evidence may not even get off the ground. 
Even if we reach a state where rigorous scientific 
support for individualization is available, there are many 
practical and policy reasons for not permitting the traditional 
forensic sciences to make the individualization leap. 
IV. INDIVIDUALIZATION TESTIMONY: NOT HELPFUL 
The 2009 National Research Council report on the 
forensic sciences called for more transparency and less 
exaggeration: “Forensic reports, and any courtroom testimony 
stemming from them, must include clear characterizations of 
the limitations of the analyses, including measures of 
uncertainty in reported results and associated estimated 
probabilities where possible.”73 Fallacy offered a similar call. It 
argued that scientific foundations need to be improved, the 
application of those foundations to case-specific findings needs 
to be improved, and examiners’ personal views about the 
evidence need to be kept out of reports and testimony.  
Given (a) the current lack of scientific support for claims 
related to individualization in the traditional forensic sciences, 
and (b) the likelihood that jurors will not meaningfully 
differentiate an examiner’s individualization opinions from a 
statement of scientific fact about individualization,74 we suggest 
that forensic examiners should be barred from offering 
individualization opinions. Individualization opinions violate 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that scientific 
opinion testimony, to be admissible, must “assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” 
  
 72 Cole, supra note 14, at 31-32 (discussing the “perverse incentives created 
by the current weak legal regime that permits extremely strong claims like 
‘individualization’ without empirical support”). Professor Kaye appreciates this point as 
well. He notes that “a strong argument can be made” for excluding comments by an 
examiner related to why he thinks a match is probative of identity “to encourage more 
extensive research.” Kaye, supra note 5, at 1185 n.86. 
 73 NRC Report, supra note 4, at 21-22; see also id. at 185. 
 74 Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic 
Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009); Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, 
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and 
Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1169 (2008). 
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and must be “based upon sufficient facts or data.”75 Opinions 
about whether a marking has been individualized to its one 
and only possible source ordinarily are not based upon 
sufficient facts or data. Nor do they provide assistance to the 
trier of fact beyond that which can be gained from a less 
grandiose presentation of the forensic science findings, and a 
more candid presentation of their limitations. Instead, 
individualization testimony has considerable potential to 
mislead factfinders rather than to assist them. Though Federal 
Rule of Evidence 704 expressly permits the offer of an ultimate 
opinion (such as here, on identity), testimony admitted under 
Rule 704 still must pass the helpfulness requirements of Rule 
702 and be based on adequate data to support the opinion.76 A 
forensic scientist’s opinion about source identification or 
individualization provides no more value to factfinders than 
what could be provided by more data-based statements, while 
having more potential to mislead.77  
In conclusion, forensic scientists should not be 
permitted to capitalize on the lack of supportive scientific data 
about either characteristic frequency or their own diagnostic 
reliability by going beyond what is known and what can be 
stated on good grounds. They should not be permitted to say, in 
effect, “trust me: that’s the source.” Real scientists don’t say 
“trust me.” They provide data. 
  
 75 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 76 “The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to 
admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of 
fact . . . .” FED. R. EVID 704 advisory committee’s note. 
 77 Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective 
Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 747 (1992) (finding, in 
Experiment 4, that both judges and jurors were far more likely to find liability when 
provided with expert testimony consisting of the relevant data plus the expert’s 
personal opinion that the defendant was the source, than when they were presented 
with all the same information but not the expert’s conclusory opinion). 
